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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE S'L\TE OF CTAII, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent. { 
vs. ' 
HAROLD N !ELSEN and) I 
JANE BAXTER, 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF XATURE OF CASE 
The appellants appeal from their conviction of the 
offense of unlawfully conspiring to commit an act for 
the obstruction of justice or the due administration of 
the laws in violation of Section 76-12-1 (5}, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,YER COURT 
The appellants 1-Iarold Nielsen and Jane 11 _ >ax+,.1 
were charged by information on the 12th dav of· J " 
• '1111'' 
1964, with the crime of conspiring to commit an act f:;
1 
the obstruction of justice or the due administratio
11 
fJf 
the law. A motion to quash the information was madt 
and denied. Subsequently, trial was had on the 16th <lai 
of September, 1964, before the Honorable Lewis J011~, 
in the District Court of the First Judicial Distriet. 
Cache County. The jury found the defendants guiln 
and from the conviction the appellants prosecuted tbi·, 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah submits the conviction should~ 
affirmed. 
STATE~iENT OF FACTS 
The information charging the appellants allegeu 
that the appellants did on or about the 1st day of Feo-
ruary, 1962, in Cache County, Utah, unlawfully con 
spire to commit an act for the obstruction of justice v 
the due administration of the laws by conspiring to pn" 
cure the dismissal in the case of State v. Geurcio by tm 
appellant Jane Baxter changing her statement oft~ 
facts alleged to have occurred by reason of both appel-
lants receiving a money consideration from Geurei-
(R. 8). A motion to quash the complaint on the groun~-
2 
.... 
· ~·t· 1·)-l ( .-J 1 Ctali Code Annotated, lU:):~, 
..: t on ' >- • 1 ' tl:·it ~,ee ' - I . l l' )~·, ... ,. 
' ... t·t tonal was made and< emec ( ·\.. :_ / i. l li.' ii::~ t1IJCdb I ll l . . , < • . ••• 
1 . , t . ed a plea of not gwlty ( R. :2 .)) ,t. id tnd 
.,, i·el1all1~ en < r , . 
"t'' ·. 1 the matter 011 February 1(), 1965. "\. .J~irr \\:t' itJ< Oil . 
I 
.1 . t'llrrnts guilty. The appellants prosecuted foti!i• r ie a1JP • ' · • . 
• . , I 1·Jiich was dismissed by this court and therc-th~ appet1 ' · . . 
. · ·t·1t·e<l The ·v11Jellants' sole contention 1s that :1tter rems , " ' r .., 
[ t . n (""J' <>f Section 76-12-1, Utah Code An-.\ll )St'C 1() I v 
notated, 1953, is unconstitutional for vagueness. 
ARGClVIENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 76-1:2-1 ( 5), UTAH CODE AN-
X01'ATED, 1953, IS CONSTITUTION AL TO 
THE EXTEXT TH.AT IT .\IAKES CRil\IIN AL 
A CO~SPlRACY TO COl\l.MI'f ANY ACT FOR 
THE PERrERSION OR OBSTRUCTION OF 
JlJSTlCE OR THE DUE ADMJNISTRATION 
OF THE LA 'vs. 
The appellants conternl that Section 7u-12-l ( 5), 
Ctah Code Anuotated, l g53, relating io the crime ot' 
ronspiracy to commit any act for the perversion or ob-
struction of justice or the due administration of the laYl'S 
is uncoustitutional because it is so vague that me11 of 
eonunon iutelligence must neeessarily guess at its 
meaning. 
. Respondent submits that the act to the extellt that 
it relates tu the erime of a conspirac~· directed (o thr~ 
3 
perversion or obstruction of justice or the rlue ad :. 
• lll.11. 




law and having a sufficiently specific and definite c ·· 
ll\lr 
age as to be constitutional. 
l. The IJ-f usser cases. The appellants contend tlw: 
the decisions at the various levels of the case of Star, 
v. Musser, llO Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 ( 1946 1 1·,, . ' \.tf, 
granted and vacated; Musser v. State of Utah, 333 r.s. 
95 ( 1948) ; State v. Musser, ll8 Utah 537, 223 P.2J 
193 ( 1950), afford them a basis for contending that !lit 
provision of Section 76-12-1 ( 5) , Utah Code Annotateri. 
1953, relating to the perversion or obstruction of justic 
or the due administration of the laws is unconstitutional. 
Although these cases dealt with the same section of tht 
Utah statutes, they do not support the proposifon for 
which they are urged. 
In State v. Musser, llO Utah 534, 175 P.2d 721 
( 1946), the appellants were convicted of a criminal co:i· 
spiracy "to commit acts injurious to public morals" hy 
advocating and advising the practice of polygamy. The 
appellants challenged several aspects of their trial and 
contended that the information did not charge a pubiil 
offense because they had a right under the First Amenii· 
ment to the United States Constitution to adrocat1 
polygamy. The conviction was affirmed by this court 
Certiorari was granted in Musser v. State, 333 U.S. 9j 
(1948). The judgment was vacated and the cmtie 
remanded to the Utah Supreme Court. The Uniieo 
States Supreme Court, contrary to the statement made 
4 
--
ll . t ' brief. did 11ot declare the provisions . ti t' •1 nne ,tll s 
111 
1 'rr ·I "I J t' • J·tckson YTiti1w . l ·t· l ite YOH . ,,J r. us tee ' . ' ,., 
i the l ta l s ,1 L . . • 
'
1
· • ··t. expresslv noted that the appellant•; 
1'pr ti1e may111 ~ • • . I . S t' I )" 
I . I with the crime of v10 atmg ec 1011 t .;-11 ere L' ii1rge( . . 
. l tab Code Annotated, 1943, "m that they con-
Jl l. · · · . · bl.· .. l · ***' " . d 't ''<)Innut acts m 1urious to pu 1c m01 ,1 s. ,p1re o " · . . . 
· 1·t,· (>f' tl1e ''Ot1rt was of the opm10n drn t the The ma 1or . "' 
l · · 
0
s!i(itild be returned to the Utah Supreme Court , ,ee1s1on . 
for the purposes of giYing the Utah court an oppor-
tunitr to rule upon the constitutionality of the S tntu t-e. 
The ;najority of the court stated: 
''***Rehearing 1_·om·inees us that questions are 
inherent in tliis appeal \\·hid1 were not presented 
to or considered b~· the Ctah Supreme Court and 
which inrnh-e determination of state law. *** 
* * * 
*** "rhat the statutes of a State mean, the 
extent to which any proYision may be limited by 
other Acts or by other parts of the same Act, are 
questions on which the highest court of the State 
has the final word.***" 
Three justices dissented 011 the grounds that the Con-
\titution of the United States protected the advoeacy. 
teachi11g. counseling and a<h-ising of the practice nr 
pol~·gam~· so long as it <li<l not constitute a clear :md 
present danger. On remand, in State v. Musser, 118 
rtah 537, 223 P.2d 193 ( 19.30), this court stated: 
''Sec.ti~n 103-11-l, t'".C.A., 194:J, denounces 
as a c:1mmal offense for two or more persons to 
conspir~ ' ( .3) To commit am· act i11j urious *** 
to public morals ***' · 
5 
Our problem here is to determine wheth th 
broad sweep of that general language iiier. e 
f• h h 1 f' 1 • \'IC\\' o t e w o e context o t iat statute and our other 
statutory and common laws and the histor\' ' 
• a111· background of the enactment of that statute. , '. 
b b . l' . d Ina\ e y construction im1te so as to define th. 
offense therein denounced so as 'to giYe adequ te gui~ance to those who would be law-abiding,\'. 
a~vise ~efendants of the nature of the offenst 
with which they are charged, or to guide courts· 
trying those who are accused' under that s;i~­
division. Musser v. Staie, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 
397, 398, 92 L. Ed. 562." 
It also noted that : 
"*** No language in this or any other statult 
of this state or other law thereof or any historical 
fact or surrounding circumstance con~ected wit; 
the enactment of this statute has been pointed ti: 
as indicating that the legislature intended am 
limitation thereon other than that expressed 11;, 
the face of the words used. 'Ve are therefort 
unable to place a construction on these word· 
which limits their meaning beyond their genera: 
meaning.***" 
Consequently, the only decision of this court went t 
the issue of whether the charge "to commit any ac: 
injurious to public morals," as contained in the Statutt 
was constitutional. I The court did not then conside: 
1 Interestingly enough, in the l\'lusser case, this court reli~ 
upon City of Price v. Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606, where: 
city ordinance provides that the right of people to "be secure.h 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against. unreasona0. 
searches and seizures shall not be violated." In holdmg the statt'. 
unconstitutional, this language found vague by ihe Utah i:: 
almost identical with the Federal Constitution and the d ~~ 
Civil Rights acts of 1832 which has consistently been ec 
constitutional. C.F. Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
6 
,, .. t]J'·• }Jl'O\ ;sions of sub~;cction (5) of Section /()-
\l]wu1t1 " . 
,,,_] rtah l'(lde ,\nnotated, 1~5:3. relatmg to th~ pcr-
j. ,.. • >lrtrndion of justice or the due administra-
iTl''-l<;'I Ill ! ..,, • 
,. tli•· h \\ s ,, ·ts eoustitutio11al. t :IJl I 0 I '- · ' , ' 
~. Other c11scs. 111 Strite t'. Pacl.·ard, 1~2 Utah HGU, 
., ;
1
; P.:2d .J()] ( 1952), thi:.; court noted that "statutes 
:;·ould not be dcciared unconstitutional if there is any 
··i·ilil•· h·1si'i 111Joll which they mav be sustained as reasl11 ' " ' · • • 
t:ii'.iug "ithiu the constitutional framework." Further, 
the tourt noted that "a statute will not be held ,-oid for 
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practicable etfed 
may be giYell it." This rourt also a ppro..-ed the language 
of Con11ll.1; v. Gcncrnl Construction C01npan/j, :W9 C.S. 
;38j 1 HJ:W). where the C nited States Supre1~1e Court 
said that: 
"*** a statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an ad in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." 
Consequently. in Yiewing the instant Statute, if there 
is any reasonable construction that can be gi,;e11 or any 
sensible or practicable effect that can be read into it, it 
should not he deemed unconstitutional. 
'i'he titah prm·ision is almost identical \vith the 
l ' l'f' . ~LI orma Pe11al Code. ' 18~, which provides if two or 
more per·mns conspire: 
"5. To rommit any act injurious to the public 
7 
~eal~h, to public morals, .o~ to p~rvert or obstrii 
Justice, or the due adm1mstration of the law
1
1 
they are punishable with criminal penalties. 
The question of the constitutionality of the pener 
sion or obstruction of j usticc or due administration 1,, 
the laws provision has been passed upon by the Cal: 
fornia courts and sustained as against a claim of ur.. 
constitutionality. In Lorenson v. Superior Court, 3,, 
Cal.2d 49, 216 P.2d 859 (1950), the California Supremt 
Court considered Section 182 of the California Pe
112 
Code. The California Supreme Court in response t1J~ 
challenge of the constitutionality stated: 
"Lorenson attacks the statute making crimina: 
conspiracy an offense upon the ground that iti-
so vague and uncertain as to be violative of !ht 
constitutional requirements of due process. Ht 
also contends that the indictment is equally vagtit 
and indefinite. 
Section 182 defines as criminal conspiracy ar~ 
committed with the purpose '*** to pervert or 
obstruct justice, or the due administration of th~ 
laws.' Generally speaking, conduct which consti· 
tutes an offense against public justice, or !ht 
administration of law includes both malfeasanl't 
and nonfeasance bv an officer in connection witn 
the administration~ of his public duties, and alsr 
anything done by a person in hindering or on· 
structing an officer in the performance of h~ 
official obligations. Such an offense was .recog-
nized at common law and generally pums.hahlt 
as a misdemeanor. Now, quite generall~·. it lia· 
been made a statutory crime and, under s.mn~ 
circumstances, a felon):. Burdick, Law of CrJDlei 
8 
ll946l, vol. l, p. 382, et seq.; 20 Cal. Jur. 347-
354. 
In California, the statutes relating to 'Crimes 
Aaainst Public Justice' are found in Part I, 
Trlle Vll, of the Penal Code. Bribery, escapes, 
rescues, perjury, fa ls if ying evide~ce, and other 
acts which would have been considered offenses 
against the administration of justice at common 
law are made criminal by legislative enactment. 
Section 182, subdivision 5, is a more general sec-
tion making punishable a conspiracy to commit 
anv offense against public justice. The meaning 
of 'the words 'to pervert or obstruct justice, or the 
due administration of the laws' is easily ascer-
tained by reference either to the common law 
or to the more specific crimes enumerated in 
Part I, Title VII. A conspiracy with or among 
public officials not to perform their official duty 
to enforce criminal laws is an obstruction of 
justice and an indictable offense at common law. 
People v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 253 N.,V. 
296. In the same category is a conspiracy to 
obtain the release of a person charged with a 
felony by presenting a worthless and void bail 
bond. Such a conspiracy has been held to be a 
perversion of the due administration of the law, 
and an offense within the meaning of subdivision 
5 of section 182 of the Penal Code. People v. 
Ambrose, 31 Cal.App. 460, 160 P. 840. 
To comply with the constitutional requirement 
of due process of law, the crime for which a 
defendant is being prosecuted must be clearlv 
defined, hut it is onlv necessarv that the words 
used in the statute b~ well enotigh known to en-
able those persons within its reach to understand 
and correctly apply them. 'To make a statute 
9 
sufficiently certain to comply with constitut· . . . . . 1ona 
reqrnrements, J~ is not :1eeessary that ;t f . ' 
d t ·1 d 1 d .ti . . . ur:1:11 e a1 e p an~ ~n ;"P~CI ca tious ,"f. the aef\ 
1 
conduct prolub1ted. I cople v. Smith. :Jn l , 
App. Supp.2d 7-18, 752, U2 P.::?<l 10:3U, lU±t .. 
Although higher standards of ecrtaint r ,1 i:; , 
required of penal than of ci,·il statut~s. L .. 1 
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, :2;'58 C.S. 2-U, -12 s.~·;1 
289, ()() L. Ed. 595, a .,tatute is sutfieicntlr terta: 
if it employs words of long usage or with a c11111. 
mon law meaning, 'ilotw1thstarnlii1g an den:e 11 : 
of degree in the defillition as to wbid1 estimates 
might differ.' Connally v. General Const. l'ri. 
269 U.S. 385, 4fi S. Ct. 12t>, 128, 70 L. Ed. 322: 
International Harvester Co. v. Kentuch. 231 
e.s. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284; XashY 
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S.Ct. 780, 5il. 
Ed. 1232. For example, the courts lrnYe uphe!O 
statutes employing such terms as: 'to make diL· 
gent effort to find the owner,' Pacific Coasl 
Dairy v. Police Court, 214 Cal. 668, 8 P.2d Hll. 
141, 80 A.L.R. 1217; 'unreasonable speed.' fa 
parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442, 21 
.A.L.R. 1172: 'unjustifiable physieal pain ur 
mental suffering,' People v. Curtiss. 116 Cal. 
App.Supp. 771, 300 P. 801, 802; 'practice law, 
People v. Ring, 2() Cal.App.Supp.:.?cl 7fi8. iii P 
2d 281 · and 'to the annovance of anv other per· ' .. . ' 
son,' People v. Beifuss, 22 Cal.A.pp.Supp.11! 
755, 67 P.2d 411, 412. 
Considering the well-settled meaning at rom· 
mon law of the words 'to pervert or obstruct n;'· 
tice, or the due administration of the law.' the 
l d 'fi · · · the Peml ot 1er an more spec1 .c prov1s1011s 111 . · 
"' d · '(' · A · t Pubh Jui· \.. o e concermng rnnes gams ' 
tice,' and th.:.: reLttive c:ertainty of wonls et::· 
10 
--
ployed in sta~utes which ha~·e been held ~·alid, it 
·annot be said that subsection 5 of section 182 ~f the Penal Code is unconstitutional.***" 
Clearly. the same reasoning is applicable to the language 
now before the court. 
In People v. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d 510, 2.J.8 
P.2d 520 ( 1952), the court was called upon to construe 
the same section of the California Penal Code. The 
appellants in that case relied upon the case of .1..l'Iusser 
<'.Utah, 333 U.S. 35 (1948). The court ruled that the 
Musser ease did not purport to adjudicate the constitu-
tionality of the Ctah statute but returned the matter to 
the l'tah Supreme Court. The court said that the Cali-
fornia statute, based upon the well-settled meaning of 
;he words at common law, must be sustained as consti-
tutional. 
In People v. Henderson, 120 Cal.App.2d 50, 2GO 
P.2d 639 ( 1953), the court again sustained the consti-
tutionality of the provision. Most recently, in Calhoun 
v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 18, 291 P.2d 474, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court again ruled that subsection 5 of 
Section 182 of the California Penal Code was consti-
tutional and stated: 
"There is no merit in the contention that sub-
division 5 of section 182 of the Penal Code is 
unconstitutional. The constitutionalitv of this 
~tatut~ was expressly upheld in Lo~enson v. 
~uper1or Court. 3.5 Cal.2<l 49, 59-61, 216 P.2d 
~~9, and People v. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2cl 510, 
J 9, ~J.8 P.2d 520. And, contrary to· Calhoun's 
11 
contention, full consideration was g·iYeu 1· 11 
d ... M s . ()It ec1s1on m usser v. , tate of l'tal1 3·->~ r·. , ' •JtJ ~ 
95, 68 S.Ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. M>i. See Peop! ... 
Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.:!d at pages 5i:!-j23 t.; 
P.2d 520." ' - ~ 
Consequently, based upon the above decisions 1liru::;. 
in point with the Utah statute, it is submitted there;, 
no merit to the appellants' contention. 
In State v. Geurts. 11 U.2d 345, 359 P.td i; 
( 1961), this court considered the contention that th: 
term "malfeasance in office" was so vague as to ht 
uncertain and invalid. On the basis of State t. Pachwa. 
supra, this court ruled the statute constitutional an: 
stated: 
"Defendant contends that the phrasing of the 
statute authori'.ling rerrnrrnl for 'malfeasance 11 
office' is so indefinite that it should be dechmr 
unconstitutional for vagueness, citing numerou. 
cases where criminal statutes have been declare~ 
invalid for that reason. It is not to be doubte1l 
that a penal statute must be sufficientlr definite 
to provide a guide for those governed by it. !· 
is also true th;1t the basic meaning of the ten1 
'malfeasance' is evil doing. In that sense it: 
admittedly somewhat general and diffic~1lt n1 
precise definition as is acknowledged in enmin.1 
law texts and other legal publications referred!· 
by the defendant. But it is significant that cbpt!t 
the fact that rna!feasan<'e was rceogniicd at e~'i' 
mon law. and Las been widelv used in co:1~t;ti: 
tions and statufes, no anthorit.v hns been cited" 
found whid1 hold-; it to he so ~·aguP a~ to reni:: 
a datute 111K·11~:st'.tutional. ***" 
12 
A similar result was reached by the Oklahoma 
· State z· Barnett 60 Oki. Criminal Rep., 355, 
Court Ill · ' . . 
IJ(i P.~d 77 ( 1936), where the statute proh1b1te<l the 
t, . of an'' gratuitv reward or present from any accep ance . . ' . . 
bank bv any public official and also made crunmal the 
act of ~ny public official where the individual is found 
to hare been guilty of any "corruption or misconduct 
;n office.'' See also Kent v. State, 18 Geo.App. 30, 88 
S.E. 713 ( 1916). 
The words "perYersion or obstruction of justice 
•Jr the due administration of the laws" as used in the 
l'tah statute have a long common law history. In Com-
monrrealth v. Machan, 177 Penn. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 
788 ( 1955), it is stated : 
"The common law is sufficiently broad to 
punish as a misdemeanor, although there may be 
no exact precedent, any act which directly injures 
or tends to injure the public to such an extent 
as to require the state to interfere and punish 
the wrongdoer, as in the case of acts which in-
juriously ... obstruct, or pervert public justice, 
or the administration of government." 
In Kilpatricli· 11• State, 72 Geo.App. 669, 34 S.E.2d 
719 (1945), it was stated that the offense of obstruction 
rif justice would include acts dissuading, preventing or 
~ttempting to dissuade or prevent a witness from attend-
rng a trial or testifyin<J' therein. See also Perkins 
Criminal Law, p. 422 (~958), where it is noted tha~ 
obstruction of justice has a substantial and well-define<l 
common law meaning. In Clark and l\Iarshall Cr:mes 
6th Ed 1 . ~ ' - ' ., ~ 1401, it is stated: 
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"Any act w ~1ich inj uriouslv affects ob ·t . 
1 d . . . . ' s fli['t, or corrupts t 1e a mmistrabon of public · , :. 
tl d · · t · f' l .)liS\1\t or le a mm1s ra hon o · t le government .·
1
. · 
l d . l . or111 i·· ias a irect tern ency to do so, is a mis<len , ' 
t 1 ,, lean"' a common aw. · 
~ublic policy requires the punishment 01 at'· 
wluch corrupt or obstruct, or which h~'.-e a dirtt' 
tendency to corrupt or obstruct, the adminis1r" 
tion of justice and of the government, and ;1;. 
such act is punishable as a misdemeanor a: 
common law. ***" 
In S;l}kC/,' v. Director of Public Prosecution8 , lfiii~ 
A.C. 528, the I-louse of Lords noted that at conllllui 
law it was a clearly recognized offense of interferi11~ 
with the course of justice. It stated: 
"It is an offence at common law to interfe11 
with the course of justice, such as persuadini 
witnesses not to give evidence (Roberts' Ca~r 
or fabricating evidence (R. v. Vreones): ornd 
ing a false accusation of crime to the police 1R 
v. Manley)." 
In Roberts Case, 3 Cokes Institutes 139 (1569).11· 
early English court ruled that it was an offense to per· 
suade a witness not to give evidence. In Regina v. Baili 11 
ll95Cl, N.I. 15, the Court of Criminal AppealofNortl:-
ern I re land observed: 
"The catalogue of common law offence~ rela! 
ing to conduct which harms or tends to harlll '.·: 
public interest is very extensive. . . · lrn: 1' 
· · l l l l · · l ·e\'eral fan crunma aw ms oug recogrnie< s . 
well-defined. :·ategories of this type of .otter: 
d f 1 , • L • l "fC J1sCllS)c
1 
an , o t11ese. i.'.>-<J m parllcU ar "e u .. 
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in the argument bef:ore. us, namel):, (I) the ca te-
gorY of acts const1tutmg what is known as a 
con~mon nuisance, and . ( ~) th~ category ~f ~cts 
prejudicial to the admm1strat10n of public JUS-
tice .... " 
In Russell on Crime, 12th Ed., Y ol. 2, page 1481, it 
is stated: 
·'All combinations to subvert public justice are 
now regarded as indictable. They fall into three 
classes: 
1. Conspiracies to make false accusations of 
crime or unfounded civil claims. 
:!. Conspiracies to threaten to make false accusa-
tions or claims. 
3. Conspiracies to interfere with the fair trials 
of pending proceedings." 
Russell also notes at page 1484, citing substantial com-
mon law precedent that conspiracies to interfere with 
a fair trial of proceedings include any act: 
''To dissuade or prevent witnesses from giving 
eYidence, or to prevent a witness from attend-
ing the trial, or to prepare witnesses to sup-
press truth. To bribe or tamper with jurors, 
or to corrupt judges. Deceit and collusion in 
courts of justice by submitting fabricated evi-
dence or otherwise.***" 
In I Burdick Law of Crime, § 283, it is stated: 
--
"Thus ~ar, the offenses of public officers have 
be~n cor:s1dered, but private persons may also be 
gml~y: m v.arious ways, of offenses against the 
a<lmm1strahon of .iustice, or, as otherwise said, 
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of offenses obstructing justice. Bv the . 
1 't . . d • conunor, aw, 1 1s a mis emeanor to do anv act ·h· · 
t ht t · d · 11 1cn preven sf, o bs1 ;u~ s, .1mpe es, or hinders the du; course o pu 1c Justice, and, under statutes . · 
t f th. h . ,so1u' ac s o 1s c aracter are pumshable as felonie;. 
Most of the offenses which are usually cla u und~r the te.r!11, 'obstruction. of justice,' ~!:, 
~ece1ved spec1fi: names, as resisting or obstruc!-
mg the execution of legal process; resisting i'' 
obstructing an officer in performance of a~· 
legal duty; wilful disobedience to judicial orded 
libel .or sl~nder o~· judicial ~fficers; ?ribery ofi 
pubhc officer; bribery of a Juror; m1sprisionoi. 
or compounding, a felo~; suppression of m 
dence; preventing or dissuading a witness from 
testifying; tampering with a witness; perjUIT 
barratry; maintenance; champerty; escape; r~­
cue and prison breach. These specific offeIL~ 
may not include all possible acts which may teni 
to obstruct justice, but they practically core 
the subject in general." 
See also Slomer v. People, 25 Ill. 70; Commonwea/tn1 
Berry, 141 Ken. 477; 133 S.E. 212; Garland v. Stal1 
112 Md. 83, 75 A. 631. 
In People v. Tenerowicz, 266 .Mich. 276, 253 X.W 
269 ( 1934 ) , the court noted : 
"A conspiracy to obstruct justice was ana· 
an indictable offense at common law. If the cu 
spiracy is an agreement or under.standing t~. 
violation of certain criminal law will not b~ P~ 
secuted it is not necessarv to set forth ID:: indictm~nt all the elements 0 of the offense r~~t'~. 
to which the conspiracy is alleged. as .wolf!· 
required in a prosecution of the crime 1tse · · 
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stead, it is sufficient to designate. the conspir~fl 
crime hv its common law generic name or m 
~;·ords of the statute, if it is a statutory offense." 
The instant case therefore comes well within the defined 
accepted meaning of the term "perversion or obstruction 
1Jf justice or the due administration of the laws" as used 
at eommon law. The facts in the instant case show an 
allegation which would be a form of bribery or at least 
the suppression of evidence or tampering with the wit-
ness. There is a substantial difference between the broad 
phraseology "public morals" and the rather narrow ac-
cepted meaning of obstructing public justice. In the 
latter case, the usual and accepted framework of judi-
cial proceediugs is involved. The individual is clearly 
on notice that if he tampers with, perverts or obstructs 
the trial of any case, criminal or civil, he will run afoul 
of the law. tTnder these facts and circumstances, there 
can be no doubt within the meaning of State v. Geurts, 
supra, that the Statute involved here has a clear and 
well-accepted meaning and is not so vague or unreason-
able as to render it unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
. It appears that the appellants' argument that Sec-
tion 76-IZ-l(.5), Ctah Code Annotated, 1953, is un-
constitutional cannot be sustained. Language is always, 
at best, subject to ambiguity, but in the instant case, the 
C'onduct alleged and the wording of the Statute :fit to-
uether "~ , II d fi d . . 
1c • " ,t 1.re - e nc cr1mmal act. The appclJ.:rnt<; 
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l 
are in no position to challenge the constitutionality ,
11 
the Statute. The presumption in favor of conc·t.t ,, 111· 
tionality is supported by the long historical acceptanct 
of the meaning of the statutory language. There is l!r, 
basis for reversal. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondenl 
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